This volume presents new perspectives on the metaphilosophical view of equilibrism. It features original contributions from leading epistemologists who specialize in metaphilosophical issues.
Philosophers have always been interested in the true nature and ultimate goals of their own enterprise. Equilibrism is a new and increasingly popular metaphilosophical vision that offers an alternative to views that are intoxicatingly optimistic or depressingly pessimistic about the purpose of philosophy. According to equilibrism, philosophers are to develop theories that are in harmony or equilibrium with their own pre-philosophical convictions. Collectively, philosophy aims at populating the logical space with consistent philosophical theories, or stable equilibria. The chapters in this volume address, among others, the following questions: Can we really settle for a more modest goal than the intellectual maintenance of our respective philosophical beliefs (equilibria)? Does the intellectual maintenance of our own equilibria really entitle us to rationally hold on to their truth? If we are sympathetic to equilibrism, what doxastic attitude should we adopt towards the propositions featuring in the equilibria we develop? Are all our beliefs that we have turned into an equilibrium equally firm? To what extent should we care about or respect our commonsensical opinions in philosophical theorizing?
Equilibrism in Metaphilosophy will appeal to scholars and graduate students interested in metaphilosophy, the epistemology of philosophy, philosophical methodology, the ethics of belief, and metaphilosophical skepticism.
